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1. Folk psychology as attribution of the attitudes
The everyday human practices of predicting, explaining, interpreting, judging,
coordinating and otherwise socially interacting with others are grounded in an
understanding of others as minded agents. This understanding of others is
commonly understood as requiring the ability to attribute mental states—
paradigmatically beliefs and desires. However, there is good reason to think that
the commonsense conception of the mind is pluralistic, and not limited to the
attribution of propositional attitudes. While it is true that part of the
commonsense view is that people act for reasons, and that those reasons are
mentally represented propositions, the folk also think that people act because of
who they are as persons. I will argue that people predict and explain behavior by
appeal to personality traits, and that at least some personality traits cannot be
understood as an oblique reference to beliefs, desires, or any other propositional
attitude.
My account is at odds with the traditional view of folk psychological
understanding of other minds, which emphasizes the attribution of propositional
attitudes (Churchland 1981). Though some recent work in folk psychology
recognizes that our understanding of other minds is not exhausted by our
understanding of other's beliefs and desires (Gallagher 2006; Goldman 2006;
Hutto 2004), the paradigmatic presentation of folk psychology remains wedded to
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the propositional attitude model, as is demonstrated in the recent theories offered
by Nichols and Stich (2003) and Godfrey-Smith (2005).
The idea that folk psychology must involve the attribution of propositional
attitudes is also reflected in the way we teach it. For example, in William Lyons’s
recent philosophy of mind textbook, he describes folk psychology using the
following example:
I might predict Mary’s future behavior by saying, “We cannot count on
Mary’s vote because she will almost certainly not turn up to the Faculty
meeting, because she believes that Fred will be there and she just cannot
stand Fred” (Lyons 2001, p. 118).
As the story goes, we attribute beliefs and desires to Mary (the belief that
Fred will come to the meeting, the desire to avoid Fred) plus a covering law (e.g.
people do what they desire to do, ceterus paribus) and conclude that she will not
attend the meeting.
While clearly a feature of the theory theory account of folk psychology,
and some hybrids (e.g. Nichols and Stich 2003), the attribution of propositions is
also implicated in various versions of simulation theory. For example, Alvin
Goldman has argued that the attribution of mental states is necessary to get a
simulation started. When beginning any mental simulation, he suggests we
assume that the agent is like us, that we share relevant psychological features.
This assumption makes us accept explanations that seem natural to us and
reject those that are less natural (Goldman 1989). Goldman even suggests that
the simulator should assume shared basic likings and desires, unless there is
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reason to think otherwise. In order to make these assumptions, we must
attribute propositional attitudes.
The claim that we must predict and explain behavior via the attribution of
beliefs and desires can be challenged on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Attributing personality traits to people in order to predict and explain is an
important part of our folk psychology, and it is distinct from ascribing content to
people's mental states. I will examine the relationship between the attitudes and
traits by discussing how both are used in predicting and explaining behavior.
This analysis demonstrates that trait attribution and belief/desire attribution are
distinct practices, and reflect different ways we have of understanding others.
The many ways in which we understand others and their actions is not something
that has been adequately acknowledged in the folk psychology debate, and
recognizing the plural nature of our folk psychology has important implications.

2.1 Prediction
It is perhaps too obvious to state that belief/desire attribution is neither
sufficient nor necessary for predicting behavior. I may know that Fred believes
there is a tiger in front of him, and that he doesn't want to be eaten by the tiger,
but from that I can't predict whether he will run, back away slowly, or freeze.
Conversely, I can predict that my student will show up at 3 p.m. for a make-up
exam, because he said he would. To make the later prediction I need not know
what motivates the student to act; I need only appeal to a simple inductive rule
that people generally do what they say they are going to do.
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However, one might object that it is necessary to have some underlying
understanding of the target’s attitudes before selecting and applying a heuristic.
For example, one might claim that in order for me to understand what my student
is saying, I must attribute propositions to him because true communication
requires that the audience recognize that the utterer has a particular mental
state. In this case, in order to understand the meaning of the acoustic blasts
emanating from the student, I must believe that my student believes that he will
be in my office at 3 p.m. ready to take the exam. Thus, one cannot use a simple
heuristic like “people generally do what they say they are going to do” without
attributing a belief to the utterer.
While it may be true that communication between two people involves the
recognition that the other is an intentional agent, it doesn’t follow that for each
particular utterance made the audience must consider the mental states
associated with that particular utterance. Indeed, there are some people who
communicate but who seem not to have the ability to attribute beliefs. Children
younger than three years old do not use false belief contrastives in conversation
(Bartsch and Wellman 1995), nor do they pass the false belief task (Wellman et
al. 2001). These young children are not thought to have much understanding of
belief, and there is reason to think that they still lack a robust understanding of
belief at age four. Even after they pass the false belief task, it takes several
more years before children gain an understanding of the referential opacity of
belief (Apperly and Robinson 1998; 2003). Belief is special this way; plenty of
other mental state concepts, including the desire concept, develop much earlier.
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Yet, children do appear to understand very well what others mean by their
utterances before they pass the false belief task, and hence are able to treat
others as intentional agents. For example, children who fail the false belief task
are still able to answer memory questions about the events of a story, thus
demonstrating some understanding of the story and the utterer’s words (Wimmer
and Perner 1983; Wellman et al. 2001). By two years old children are talking
about desires (Bretherton & Beeghly 1982) and they describe themselves and
others using intentional mental state terms other than belief (Dunn, Bretherton
and Munn 1987). This suggests that these young children do recognize that
others are minded, intentional agents, but that this knowledge is not dependent
on the ability to attribute beliefs. The kinds of predictions infants and toddlers
can make, then, are not the result of belief attribution.1
Without explicitly acknowledging that another has beliefs with specified
content, a child can use the “people generally do what they say they are going to
do” heuristic in order to predict that father will chase her when he says, “I’m going
to chase you!” The child need only know that the utterer is the right sort of thing
to apply the heuristic to in order to use it successfully to predict behavior. In
order to make largely accurate predictions, the child must realize that her father,
unlike the tape recorder that emits the same sounds, is an intentional agent.
However, on this model, the child doesn’t need to attribute to him a particular
belief associated with his utterance. She doesn’t do that because she can’t, not
until she gains a more robust understanding of belief. Yet she is still able to
make the prediction.

5 It's in your nature

It's worth noting, as well, that nonhuman animals are skilled at predicting
behaviors of their conspecifics, predators, and prey, even though it is doubtful
that most other species understand that others have beliefs. Given that young
children and nonhuman animals are able to predict behaviors without considering
the content of another's belief, it follows that being capable of attributing both a
belief and a desire is not necessary for predicting some behavior.

2.2 Prediction and trait attribution
Since young children can predict behavior without attributing beliefs, there
must be methods for making predictions of intentional behaviors that do not rely
on considering a person's primary reason for acting. Social psychological
research suggests that rather than relying primarily on belief and desire
attribution, humans make predictions based on a number of biases, stereotypes,
trait and mood attributions, normative inferences about what people in such a
situation ought to do, inductive generalization over past behavior, etc. In what
follows I will focus on trait attribution as a method of predicting behavior.
Personality traits are properties of a person that are taken to be stable,
and they are often used to describe behavioral dispositions. Humans use
personality traits in many different contexts, such as when they are describing
others. In one study where students were asked to provide confidential
descriptions of their classmates, 65% of the terms used were trait terms (Park
1986). For example, classmates were more often described using personality
trait terms such as being kind or smart, and less often described using physical
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descriptors such as having pink hair. Traits are also used to make sense of
people’s behavior, to form impressions of others, to make both predictions and
explanations, and to arrive at judgments (Miller 1984; Ross and Nisbett 1991;
Winter and Uleman 1984). Because people understand traits as stable and
constant dispositions of an individual, they are used to make predictions of
behavior; for example, a generous person is expected to be generous both at
work and at home, and barring any unforeseen events, she is expected to remain
that way through time.2
While we often rely on personality traits to predict behavior, it has been
argued that this method is of only limited success. Predictions based on
personality traits at the expense of relevant situational features often turn out to
be false, because people often underestimate the power situations have over
behavior (Ross 1977). This tendency, called the fundamental attribution error,
has us basing our predictions more on internal characteristics of a person, such
as moods or traits, than on external factors of the situation. While we often rely
on character traits in order to figure out what someone will do next, there is
evidence that the individual’s environment and history plays a significant causal
role in behavior, and that character traits play a lesser role than people expect.
Experiments such as Milgram’s infamous obedience experiments, where
subjects were ordered to shock people at ever-increasing levels of voltage
(Milgram 1963), and Darley and Batson's Princeton Seminary study, which found
that theology students' willingness to help someone in need was inversely
correlated with how rushed they were (Darley & Batson 1973), demonstrate the
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important role the situation has on a person’s behavior. Such studies suggest
that seemingly insignificant events could affect people’s behaviors in ways they
had not anticipated.
Folk psychology as the attribution of the attitudes is widely described in
the philosophical literature as having robust predictive power. However, the
social psychological literature suggests that our abilities to make accurate
predictions via trait attributions are limited. One might conclude, then, that
predicting through trait attribution is a less accurate method than predicting
through appeal to beliefs and desires. However, given other findings in social
psychology, this would be a hasty conclusion.
When humans form some expectation about how a person will behave,
whatever behavior subsequently occurs is usually interpreted in such a way that
it is consistent with the prior expectation. This is one possible reason that
humans think they are more accurate predictors than they really are (Olson,
Roese et al. 1996). In addition, humans tend to notice things that correspond to
our beliefs and expectations, and so we’re more likely to remember successful
predictions (Kunda 2002). Thus, even though we may be poor predictors of
behavior in some situations, it is possible that we won’t notice the failure because
we either interpret the situation so that it corresponds to our expectation, or we
forget about making the faulty prediction.
Another explanation comes from Ross and Nisbett, who argue that our
trait-based predictions are largely accurate because most of our predictions are
made in the same situation, broadly construed (Ross and Nisbett 1991). For
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example, if you form a trait description of Sue in the workplace, and you only
interact with Sue in the workplace, it is likely your prediction will be largely
accurate, since traits are stable within situations. It is only when you attempt to
generalize to another situation, such as how Sue would be as a road-trip
companion, that your prediction is likely to fail. Ross and Nisbett also suggest
that the predictor is often part of the situation she predicts, and what may appear
to be stability across situations may in fact only be the stability of the person’s
behavior in the predictor's presence. For these reasons, many of our predictions
of behavior are correct.
This isn't to suggest that we only use trait attribution and belief/desire
attribution when we predict behavior; trait attribution is just one additional method
used. Our quotidian predictions that are so ubiquitous that they disappear—the
prediction that (at least some) students will show up to class, that the driver in
front of me will stop at the stop sign, that the waiter will bring the double espresso
I ordered—are often based on other heuristics. Predictions of people we don’t
know can’t appeal directly to trait attributions, because in order to develop some
notion of a person’s trait one must have some information about the person; the
better we know a person, the better we are at judging the frequency of her
attitudes and traits (Judd et al. 1991). When predicting the behavior of unfamiliar
people we may use stereotypes, consensus effect (thinking others are like us), or
social norms when making judgments about what others will do next.
Such heuristics involve inductive generalizations about typical behaviors
over groups or individuals, and given the finding that people would be more likely
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to make accurate predictions of their own behavior if they used the base rates for
people in their situation, our best bet at making accurate predictions in an
unfamiliar situation is to determine what others have done before in a similar
situation (Vallone et. al 1990). In familiar situations, and with familiar people,
using inductive generalization over the person’s past behavior may be the best
strategy.
The social psychological picture suggests pluralism in the ways we make
predictions, since we need not appeal to beliefs and desires in order to predict
behaviors when we can appeal to personality traits or inductive generalizations
over past behavior. These are methods of prediction that might be available to
those who do not have a robust understanding of beliefs.
However, one might object that folk psychology's traditional emphasis on
belief/desire psychology can be made consistent with the social psychological
story, depending on the relationship between traits and propositional attitudes.
Perhaps when I appeal to Sue's generous nature to predict that she will
contribute to hunger relief, I simply mean that Sue wants to help others and
believes that she can fulfill that desire by contributing to hunger relief.
Understanding traits in this fashion reconciles at least part of the social
psychological picture with the traditional philosophical one, and thus evidence
from social psychology about trait attribution does not undermine the claim that
we predict behavior through the attribution of beliefs and desires. The apparent
conflict arises from the different terminology used in the different disciplines.
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I don’t think this argument is compelling. To see the problems with the
argument, let us examine the possible relationships between trait attribution and
the attribution of propositional attitudes.
We can start by examining the strongest relation, and ask whether trait
attribution is identical to belief/desire attribution. By looking at the developmental
literature, it seems clear that this relation won't hold, because children are only
able to use personality traits long after they start to use mental state attributions.
When a child is able to talk about and respond to others' beliefs and desires at
age 3 ½, she is still unable to use traits to predict behavior (Kalish 2002; Rholes
et al. 1990). While preschool-aged children are able to draw inductive inferences
about stable physical traits (Carey 1985; Gelman 1988), they are unwilling to
draw similar inferences about the stability of personality traits (see Miller & Aloise
1989; Rholes et al.1990 for reviews). For example, Rholes and Ruble showed
videos of characters acting in easily categorized ways to 5- to 10-year olds.
Even when the younger children successfully described the behavior using a trait
term, they were not likely to use the character’s past behavior or the trait to
predict future behavior (Rholes & Ruble 1984). Not until a child is in elementary
school does she start using trait attributions to form her predictions (Cain et al.
1997; Heller and Berndt, 1981; Heyman & Gelman 1999; Yuill & Pearson 1998).
This is at least three years after the child is first thought to understand that
people have beliefs that cause behavior. Given the developmental delay
between belief attribution and personality trait attribution, the two abilities cannot
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be identical. Further, this evidence shows that the ability to attribute beliefs
cannot be sufficient for attributing traits.
Another possible relation between traits and propositional attitudes is that
the ability to attribute beliefs is necessary for attributing traits. On this view, traits
are simply shorthand for beliefs and desires, and so the development of trait
attribution relies on prior understanding of belief and desire. This possible
relationship reflects the developmental data just discussed.
There is, however, empirical evidence against this view as well. Children
who are unable to attribute mental states can come to learn how to predict
behavior by attributing personality traits. Social Stories Therapy is an
intervention method designed to teach social skills to children with autism (Gray
2000). Children on the autistic spectrum are taught how to recognize salient
behaviors, apply a character trait or mood term to the behavior, and then
associate other behaviors with that label. After successful therapy, the child is
able to make predictions using the trait identifier, but she doesn’t gain a theory of
mind or an understanding of beliefs and desires as parts of a folk theory of
behavior. For example, a person with autism might be taught to associate a
smile with the term ‘happy’, and the term ‘happy’ with a number of specific
behaviors (e.g. hugging, laughing, etc.). The child with autism can be taught to
describe a smiling person as happy, and given that trait predict that the person
will engage in happy behaviors. Though one might be inclined to describe the
autistic child’s new knowledge as a theory, it is a theory of behavior, not a theory
of mental states.
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The normal understanding of traits may be analyzed in a similar fashion.
Rather than referring to mental states, a trait attribution could refer to a class of
behaviors, and hence a person with or without autism can predict behavior
without appealing to mental states. Though normals understand that others have
mental states, and these mental states may explain a person’s behavior, normals
could appeal to a similar theory of behavior to predict action without appeal to the
attitudes. If there is a normal folk theory of behavior, it would involve connecting
specific traits with other traits, and with behaviors. There is some evidence for
this view, since the data suggests that humans understand which sets of traits
are consistent, and which are not, and such models are used when we predict
what someone with certain traits will do (see Ross and Nisbett 1991 for a
review). I take these considerations as reason to think that without good
evidence to the contrary, trait attribution ought not be considered shorthand for
attribution of belief, on any non-dispositional account of belief.
To more fully examine the relationship between propositional attitudes and
traits we must look at folk psychological explanation as well as prediction. One
who thinks that an explanation for behavior will always involve at least an implicit
appeal to one's primary reasons for acting—a person's belief and pro-attitude as
Davidson would have it (Davidson 1963)—may well think that a personality trait
will fail to offer a satisfactory explanation. However, if we can predict behavior
through appeal to someone's personality traits without knowing the person's
primary reason for acting, perhaps we use traits to explain behavior as well. For
now, I hope to have demonstrated that when predicting behavior, we do not
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always need to attribute propositional attitudes. It follows that we should not
expect to find a single mechanism that subsumes all our folk psychological
predictions, since they are the result of a number of different heuristics, at least
one of which, trait attribution, is not reducible to the attribution of beliefs and
desires.

3.1 Explanation
Research in attribution theory suggests that while reason explanations in
terms of an actor's belief and desire are the most common means of answering
why questions about behavior, not all good explanations will take that form. In
one study of the frequency of different kinds of explanations people offer for
behavior, 16% of the explanations did not refer to reasons (Malle 2004). Malle
categorized the explanations people provided into three different categories,
reasons, causal history, and enabling features, and found that 61% of the
explanations referred to reasons alone, and 23% of the explanations combined
reasons and causal history. While our methods of explaining behavior include
attributing beliefs, desires, etc. to an individual, they also take account of external
factors of the situation, the individual’s perceived character traits, past behavior,
and even one’s own response to the situation (Franzoi 2003). This research
suggests that the mechanisms utilized in offering explanation, like those
implicated in prediction, are plural.
According to Heider's seminal work in attribution theory, people offer
explanations of behavior in order to fulfill two needs: to form a coherent view of
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the world, and to control the environment (Heider 1958). Whereas the
philosophy of science literature emphasizes the logical structure of explanation,
with beliefs and desires as the explanans, the social psychology literature
suggests a coherence model of explanation. The theory of explanatory
coherence developed by Paul Thagard (1989) is a more recent development of
Heider’s insight that we incorporate a number of different methods when
explaining behavior. Thagard and Kunda apply this model to folk psychological
explanation in order to describe how we “make sense” of other people, which
they think involves three different methods: categorization in terms of traits,
behaviors, social groups, etc., causal attribution, and analogy. They argue that
while we rely on these different methods, they alone are not enough, for we also
need a coherence-maximizing system to oversee these different mechanisms
and organize them into explanations that make sense (Thagard and Kunda
1997).
Research in social psychology confirms the ideas of Heider, Thagard, and
others that we are pluralistic when it comes to developing explanations for
behavior, and that coherence of some variety is important in constructing them.
Evidence suggests that we rely on coherent narrative when offering explanations
of behavior. In a well-known study of juror decision-making, it was found that
lawyers who present their arguments in narrative form are more successful than
lawyers who present arguments in some other, non-chronological order
(Pennington and Hastie 1992). Such studies suggest that we construct
imaginary scenarios in order to make sense of a person’s behavior, scenarios
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that are coherent with all we know about the actors. So for example, when a
person’s past behaviors (e.g. she always brings wine to the party) and her traits
(she is very generous) cohere with current behavior, we understand that
behavior; it makes sense to us.
The psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance also suggests
that we expect a consistent picture of others and ourselves. Cognitive
dissonance refers to the feeling of discomfort that arises when we act in a way
we take to be inconsistent with our self-image. Humans have a tendency to
confabulate explanations for behaviors that may be caused by effects such as
the fundamental attribution error, especially when those actions are contrary to
their self-image. Thus, subjects in Milgram’s obedience experiments might make
up a story about why they administered dangerous shocks rather than admit that
they are capable of harming others. And while we tend to take credit for our
successes, attributing them to aspects of our character or our behavior, when we
fail we tend to explain those actions by reference to external causes (Campbell
and Sedikides 1999).
The mechanisms underlying our ability to explain behavior are very
important to us, given that discussing people’s behavior is one of the primary
occupations of a human being. The evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar
suggests that we spend two-thirds of our conversational time talking about what
people are doing and why they are doing it (Dunbar 1996). This trend is evident
among humans at a very young age; according to one study, as early as 4 years
77% of children's conversations are about people (O'Neill 2004). Though the
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statistics may be surprising, the general point shouldn’t be: humans are social
creatures, and we are very interested in other people.
A satisfying explanation of behavior will take advantage of a number of
different available methods, and those methods will depend on what we already
know about the person whose behavior we’re explaining, as well as what we
don’t know. For example, while an inductive explanation may satisfy us when
given to explain someone we don’t know well (“Why is he drinking champagne?
Is he celebrating something?” “No, he just has it every day with lunch.”), such
responses are often not very satisfying when we want to know the deeper
motivation. Indeed, we will often provide an explanation in terms of induction
over the person’s past behavior only because we don’t have any further
information.

3.2 Explanation and trait attribution
Given the preceding discussion, it is perhaps already clear that trait
attribution can also be used to offer explanations of behavior, even though it
does not constitute a description of the reasons or the goal motivating the actor’s
behavior. In many cases, such explanations are the best that we can do.
One might object to explaining behavior in terms of trait attribution. For
example, Owen Flanagan has expressed concern about explanations that refer
to traits because they do not include the causal story leading to the behavior
being explained, but only place the act in a category of other acts (Flanagan
1984). He argues that explaining why Jack stole the candy by saying that he is a
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juvenile delinquent either describes the behavior (i.e. to steal candy is to be a
juvenile delinquent) or it amounts to an inductive explanation (e.g. Jack always
does stuff like that). Despite these concerns, in some cases explanations in
terms of trait attribution will be satisfactory; if you know about something common
to all juvenile delinquents, that trait attribution might help you to understand why
the child behaved as he did. Knowing that Jack is a juvenile delinquent helps us
decide how to respond to his behavior, for example. Trait attribution can serve
as an explanation when it yields additional information.
Note too that attributing traits to people when explaining their behavior
may have some implications about the kinds of reasons a person might have had
(or might not have had). For example, by knowing that Jack is a juvenile
delinquent, you can infer that his reason for stealing the candy probably wasn't to
test the store's security system, for example.3 The class of possible reasons can
be limited once you attribute a trait, but a number of belief/desire sets would still
be consistent with the behavior so described. Perhaps Jack believed that
stealing the candy was the only way to gain nourishment for himself or his
younger brother. Perhaps Jack desired to cause problems for the shop-keep.
Both explanations are consistent with the trait explanation that Jack is a juvenile
delinquent.
Take another example. If Sue snaps at a student during office hours, and
the student comes to me asking what he did wrong, I might explain Sue’s actions
by saying that she is testy. That trait attribution can make sense of her behavior,
if the student knows that testy people snap for reasons unrelated to the actions of
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the snap-ee. That’s not to say that trait attributions will provide the whole story;
for someone who wanted a fuller explanation, the question might then become
“why is she so testy”, or “how did he become a juvenile delinquent?” and the
answer to those questions would take the form of a more robust narrative. Like
inductive explanations, we will sometimes offer trait explanations when we can
do no better. Other times it is clear that we do not want any more in the way of an
explanation—for example, when one explains a hated politician’s speech by
saying “He’s either an idiot, or evil, or both.”
Explanations that make sense are those in which the details are either
filled in for us, or those where we can fill in the blanks. Attribution of mental
states, traits, and generalizations about someone’s past actions, along with the
causal story of events, can provide us with a coherent and satisfactory
explanation. Sometimes we can generate the description on our own, and other
times we require more information in order to feel that we understand. What
counts as understanding for an individual will depend on that person’s
background knowledge and her reasons for asking the why-question.
Explanations of intentional behavior, like predictions of behavior, involve more (or
less) than the attribution of propositional attitudes. Not all psychological
explanations are reason explanations.
While traits are not shorthand for beliefs and desires, perhaps trait
attribution is still a type of mentalistic attribution. Some trait attributions imply
facts about a person's emotional state, such as being happy or testy. Explanation
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in terms of a person's emotions is an explanation in terms of the individual's
mental states.
Traits themselves, however, are plural. Not all traits refer to a person's
emotions, and there is reason to think that there are some traits that cannot be
identified with an individual's mental states. For one, as I argued in the last
section, there is a double dissociation between understanding traits and
understanding beliefs. Normal children come to understand personality traits
only after they understand the mental states of desire and belief, while some
children who can't attribute beliefs are able to use traits to predict behavior.
When impaired children use trait attribution, they are taught to understand traits
as dispositions to behave in certain ways. In fact, this is how traits are
understood in the psychological literature—as shorthand for kinds of behavior,
rather than anything like private states of mind. Unless we are going to return to
a behaviorist method of individuating mental states, personality traits should be
seen as distinct from any mental states, including beliefs and desires.
To further defend the distinction, note that when we attribute a personality
trait to an actor we are not always going to be attributing something that the actor
would claim for herself. Or worse, the actor might have specific beliefs that
contradict the personality traits. For example, I can predict that Mary won’t hold
the elevator for me because she is self-centered, even though Mary doesn’t
believe that she is self-centered. Negative personality traits in particular can be
useful for predicting and explaining behavior, even though they do not make up a
mental state of the individual, and even though the individual might deny that the
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trait term correctly describes her behavior. If Mary were asked to explain why she
didn’t hold the elevator, she might say, “I didn’t notice you.” However, it was the
lack of attention to her surroundings that earned her the trait of being selfcentered to begin with. Or she may not have an answer at all; as Davidson
points out, we can act intentionally yet not be able to explain why we acted
(Davidson 1963). Traits that are societally prohibited, such as being racist or
sexist, are often not claimed by people whose behavior makes them accurately
described as such. Accompanying the racist behavior may be all the narratives
of anti-racism, and the unaware racist could firmly believe on intellectual grounds
in the equality of the races to such an extent that she joins anti-racist
organizations and rallies for equality. However, at the same time she might
unknowingly discriminate against members of the race when they are not part of
her social network or class. If you asked her why she discriminated, she may
deny that she acted in such a way, claim she doesn't know, or offer an alternative
reason explanation for her action. An alternative reason explanation, however,
cannot be accepted at face value. In this case, the actor is citing her reasons
retrospectively, rather than before or during the action. She may be
reconstructing the cause of her action just as she would for another actor. Given
the tendency to confabulate explanations after the fact, and the desire to present
a positive self-image to an audience, an agent's own post hoc reason for her
action can be inaccurate. Consider Ted Bundy's bizarre explanations for his
crimes, or an anorexic's rationalization for her dieting. Sour grapes situations
give rise to another case in which untrustworthy reason explanations are given
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by an actor—i.e. when the fox walks away from the grape vine muttering, "I didn't
really want those sour grapes anyway." Maybe he is just trying to convince
himself, but if he succeeds, he will have reconstructed his reason for acting after
the fact.
If, as I've argued, traits cannot be either identical to or shorthand for sets
of beliefs and desires, if they can conflict with one’s beliefs and desires, and if
they need not be something an actor claims for oneself, then there are good
reasons to reject the idea that traits are a kind of mental state. Further, given the
conflict that can exist between a person's mental states and her traits, we
shouldn't expect trait attribution to correlate with some set of beliefs or desires an
actor has either.
At this point, one might suspect that people are not explaining intentional
behavior when they offer an explanation in terms of personality traits.
Explanations in terms of traits, one might say, can only serve as explanations of
unintentional action; all proper explanations of intentional behavior must be
reason explanations.
There are at least two reasons for rejecting the claim that explanations in
terms of traits can only explain unintentional action. For one, the objection
doesn't conform to the ordinary way people think about intentional action, since
at least in some cases we claim that people's actions are intentional even when
the actor doesn't have a primary reason for those actions. This point is
demonstrated by people's response to a story about a chairman of the board who
doesn't care about the environment, but only cares about maximizing profits
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(Knobe 2003, Malle 2006). The folk take the chairman to be intentionally
harming the environment when such harm is a known side effect of his business
decision, even though he doesn't have any reason to harm the environment—he
doesn't construe his own action qua harming the environment, but sees it qua
maximizing profits. He only has reasons for the primary behavior, not the side
effect. Like side effect cases, cases that involve acts of negligence, impolitesse,
or bias may lead to judgments of intentional action where no reason explanation
for the behavior is evident, because the actor doesn't construe her action in the
same way as the observers do. That the actor doesn't construe her actions in
that way may be explained in terms of her personality.
Further, as Hursthouse argues, some actions are arational—again, not
done for reasons in the Davidsonian sense—but are still intentional because they
wouldn't have been performed had the actor not been in the emotional state that
she was (Hursthouse 1991). Like explanations in terms of personality traits,
Hursthouse argues that explanations in terms of an actor's emotional state
cannot be understood as shorthand for an explanation in terms of beliefs and
desires, and that emotion explanations—or arational explanations in general—
ought to be seen as an autonomous variety of psychological explanation. An
example of arational action is a person's jumping up and down from excitement;
we can take the jumping behavior to be intentional, and explain it by the person's
excitement over some event, yet not be able to offer a traditional reason
explanation for the behavior; we can't "indicate what it was about the action that
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appealed" (Davidson 1963, 685), we don't know why she jumped rather than
smiled, and the actor herself wouldn't be able to answer that question.
Hursthouse argues that the folk understand some intentional actions to be
explained not by beliefs and desires, but by emotional mental states. I am
suggesting that we ought to also recognize that the folk understand some
intentional actions to be explained by nonmentalistic personality traits—some
actions are explained by who we are rather than what we think.
Of course, appeal to traits will not always answer our why questions. In
some cases, explanations in terms of traits can be seen as an oblique reference
to a person's past history. This may be true even if the individual doesn’t agree
that a past experience affected her behavior. For example, a pious person may
have come to be that way because of some behavior modification techniques
used on him as a child, yet have no knowledge of this history. However,
someone who is aware of the psychological effects of certain kinds of religious
training may explain the pious behavior in terms of the person’s early life
experiences.
Trait attribution may come in many varieties. The kinds of traits I am
concerned with here make up an interesting subset of trait attributions that resist
being analyzed in terms of propositional attitudes. For example, in response to
the question “Why did she want such a long engagement?” a perfectly normal
response might be, “She’s a careful person who takes things slowly.” It isn't that
she doesn't yet believe that her fiancée is the right person for her, nor is it that
she desires more time to asses the relationship. She can be fully committed to
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her promise, and simply be the kind of person who doesn't tend to move quickly.
In this way, the trait explanation is quite similar to Hursthouse's arational
emotional explanation of behavior. Consider Hursthouse's example of an action
explained by anger:
Jane, who in a wave of hatred for Joan, tears at Joan's photo with her
nails…I can agree that Jane does this because, hating Joan, she wants to
scratch her face…I can agree that she would not have torn at the photo if
she had not believed that it was a photo of Joan; and if someone wants to
say, "So those are the reasons for the action," I do not want to quarrel, for
these "reasons" do not form the appropriate desire-belief pair assumed by
the standard account. On the standard account, if the explanatory desire
in this case is the desire to scratch Joan's face, then the appropriate belief
has to be something absurd, such as the belief that the photo of Joan is
Joan, or that scratching the photo will be causally efficacious in defacing
its original. And my disagreement is with adherents of the standard
account, who must think that some nonabsurd candidates for appropriate
beliefs to ascribe to agents performing arational actions are available.
(Hursthouse 1991, 59-60).
In both the engagement case and in the photograph case, there may be
no appropriate set of beliefs and desires that constitute a reason for the action,
and yet these actions are intentional. The trait and the emotion explain the
behavior; Hursthouse claims that we consider the emotion to cause the behavior
too. In like fashion, one might think that it is part of folk psychology that traits
also cause action. For example, a father may attribute his reluctance to let his
daughter date to being old-fashioned, recognizing that he has no rationale for his
behavior. Being old-fashioned or conservative may be construed as causing his
decision, at least proximately.4 This issue is not central to the argument I am
defending here, but it is of interest given the significant departure from the
standard view.
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Given the folk's view that traits explain behavior, and that traits cannot
always be identified with reasons, it is part of folk psychology that not all actions
are explained by reasons. This view is at odds with the tradition. But it is a
consequence of the plural nature of folk psychology. Human behavior, like the
scorpion's stinging of the frog who kindly gave him a ride across the river, is
sometimes explainable in terms of who we are, not what we think.

4. Conclusion
Attempts to uncover the cognitive architecture subsuming our folk
psychological practices must take into account the plural nature of our
understanding of other minds. Given the arguments in favor of the view that
people use a variety of techniques when predicting and explaining behavior, we
must reject the narrow definition of folk psychology as the attribution of belief and
desire. We should accept a broader understanding of folk psychology, and give
up putting forth monolithic theories meant to account for all instances of
predicting and explaining behavior.
The plural nature of folk psychology has implications for many debates in
philosophy and cognitive science. Let me briefly mention two.
First, there are consequences for the debates around the cognitive
architecture subsuming folk psychology. Given that folk psychology includes
more than the attribution of propositional attitudes, any theory of folk psychology
that does not include a discussion of other methods of predicting and explaining
behavior will be, at best, incomplete.
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For example, simulation theory seems difficult to reconcile with folk
psychology qua trait attribution. When we simulate in order to understand
another, we replicate or emulate (Goldman 2006) another person's mental states.
This might work well enough for beliefs, desires, emotions, and the like, but it is
not obvious how simulation would permit others to identify a person's trait.
Robert Gordon's version of simulation, in which a simulator becomes the target
much like an actor becomes a character, might seem better suited to account for
a folk psychology that includes personality traits as well as mental states (Gordon
1995). However, Gordon's position takes the personality traits for granted; when
you become another, you adopt their traits. Once you've identified with another
person, perhaps you can predict and explain that person's behavior, but in order
to simulate, one must first have an understanding of another's traits, and then
use those traits in the simulation. How the traits are first identified and adopted
remain outside of Gordon's account.
Since one can learn about a person's traits discursively or through
observation, a folk psychology that includes personality traits may be more
compatible with the theory theory of folk psychology. Traits, along with mental
states, could be theoretical entities that we use to predict and explain behavior.
A second implication of a plural folk psychology relates to empirical
research on the ontogeny and phylogeny of theory of mind. Today, standard
theory of mind tests utilize predictive paradigms. Subjects in the false belief task,
for example, are asked to predict the behavior of a character with a false belief.
Chimpanzees are asked to predict where a conspecific will go to obtain food.
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The methods for studying the understanding of other minds that rely on predictive
tasks may not be the best way to determine whether an infant or an animal has
that understanding, given the availability of other heuristics (Andrews 2005). We
might expect to find more attribution of mental states in the explanation of
behaviors. Researchers designing experiments to test for theory of mind in
children and nonhumans are advised to look toward explanatory paradigms,
rather than relying on the current set of predictive ones. The current research on
chimpanzee theory of mind uses predictive paradigms in order to determine what
sort of understanding chimpanzees have about others’ minds. However, we
shouldn’t expect that chimpanzees use mental state attribution to predict
behavior in many simple cases if humans don’t. If researchers hope to find
evidence that chimpanzees appeal to mental states to make simple predictions of
behavior, they are hoping to find a more robustly mentalistic creature in the
chimpanzee than we find in the human. Examining explanation-seeking behavior
rather than predictive behavior will yield knowledge about how chimpanzees
understand other minds – knowledge that has eluded us so far.
A more theoretical implication for animal cognition research has to do with
the status of animals as social agents. If animals use induction over past
behavior and trait attribution for making prediction, just as humans do as part of
their folk psychology, then we should conclude that such animals have a form of
folk psychology as well (Andrews, forthcoming). Across species, animals need to
predict the behavior of potential prey, predators, and mates, and in social species
even more complex predictive behaviors are observed. Since most non-human
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animals probably do not have the ability to attribute complex propositional
attitudes to others, the methods animals use to make predictions likely utilize
non-mentalistic heuristics (like some trait attribution) and mentalistic methods
(like emotion attribution) that are simpler than full-blown belief/desire psychology.
While there is no denying that having an understanding of beliefs and
desires provides one with an advantage, the extent of that advantage has been
overemphasized by those who assume that our folk psychology consists wholly
of mental state attribution. If the accounts of prediction and explanation that I
have offered here are correct, the consequence is that the mature human is not
the only one with access to folk psychology. Rather, those aspects of folk
psychology that rely on inductive generalizations and trait attribution are open to
some of those who aren’t able to attribute content to other minds. We may share
aspects of our folk psychology with our non-human relatives, even if we are the
only species to offer reason explanations.
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1

The standard explanation of the performance of children who fail to attribute false beliefs is that
they lack a concept of belief. Note that this interpretation of the result rests on a representational
view of belief, according to which believing that P involves having an attitude toward a mental
representation that P. Thus, this discussion does not apply to dispositional accounts of belief,
according to which believing that P involves having some behavioral disposition pertaining to P.
2

There is some evidence that the reliance on traits over the situation may be to some extent a
cultural artifact of western culture, and that Chinese, Koreans, or Japanese may be less likely to
commit the fundamental attribution error (Nisbett 2003).
3

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for making this point.

4

There are important differences between causes in terms of emotions and causes in terms of
traits. The experience of emotion is an event, and it raises no metaphysical concerns to consider
the wave of hatred as causing the destruction. However, a personality trait, as a stable
disposition of a person, is not an event. Traits, unlike beliefs, desires, emotional experiences, or
other mental states cannot have the same sort of efficacy. If it is part of folk psychology that traits
cause behavior, as well as explain behavior, then perhaps this metaphysical worry must be
addressed.
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